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PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Rodney K. Smith. 
Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc. 1987. Pp. xv, 294. $35. 
A literal reading of the first amendment's religion clauses1 has long 
revealed a natural contradiction between an order not to establish reli-
gion and a command not to inhibit its practice. The issue of public 
prayer sharply illustrates this conflict, as a doctrinaire reading of 
either order could render publicly-supported prayer either impossible 
or untouchable. In an attempt to reconcile this conflict, Professor 
Rodney Smith2 argues that the values suggested by the first amend-
ment's constitutional history provide the "very treasure" (p. 7) needed 
to resolve difficult public prayer cases. While Smith does rehash much 
of the frequently analyzed history of the religion clauses,3 this book 
does more than merely reexamine historical data; much of Public 
Prayer and the Constitution demonstrates how the modem Supreme 
Court could apply these historical underpinnings to make its current 
public prayer decisions more consistent and legitimate. By using this 
history to suggest guidelines for the Court, Smith joins the growing 
ranks of interpretivist scholars who advocate originalism as the proper 
tool for modem constitutional analysis.4 
Public Prayer basically undertakes three tasks: an examination of 
the relevant constitutional history, an overview of the Supreme 
Court's treatment of public prayer, and suggestions for how the judici-
1. Labeled the establishment and free exercise clauses, the religion clauses require that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, Delaware Law School of Widener University. Major portions 
of this book first appeared in Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back On Again: A 
Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and 
a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (1984), and 
Smith, Now Is the Time for Reflection: Wallace v. Jaffree and Its Legislative Aftermath, 31 ALA. 
L. REV. 345 (1985). 
3. One scholar has concluded that the "search for original meaning and historical purpose 
underlying this language [of the first amendment's religion clauses] has yielded inconclusive re-
sults, and it would not be profitable to explore this matter in detail. In the end the Supreme 
Court is free to give this language the meaning it chooses .... " P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 47 (1964). 
4. In assuming that originalism is the obvious choice of constitutional interpretation, Smith's 
treatment of the major interpretation debate is cursory at best. However, great disagreement 
exists as to the proper utilization of the history of the Constitution's framing. Compare 
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981) (historical evidence of 
the framers' intent cannot constrain modem interpretation) and Brest, The Misconceived Quest 
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) (guessing how the framers would 
view today's radically different society is an inappropriate way to protect constitutional guaran-
tees) with Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981) (the 
nondemocratic nature of the Court mandates self-restraint and an originalist reading) and Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (the historically 
demonstrable intentions of the framers should be binding on contemporary interpreters of the 
Constitution). 
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ary could render decisions compatible with original intent. While the 
first part proves useful, Smith's attempt to clarify the thorny public 
prayer issue ultimately fails because no clear and consistent approach 
can be fashioned from either the framers' intent or the values preva-
lent in colonial America. 
Smith begins his analysis by demonstrating that America's concern 
for individual religious liberty and free exercise was paramount during 
the colonial era. As a consequence, a high degree of religious toler-
ance existed during this period, since the "pluralistic nature of the reli-
gious and economic forces in the colonies" (p. 35) mandated a spirit of 
cooperation. From this religious climate emerged two distinct posi-
tions delineating the extent of American religious freedom: (1) those 
who viewed Christianity as the national and "established" religion, 
and (2) those who felt that individual expression could be accommo-
dated but no one religion preferred. 
Smith associates the former position with Justice Joseph Story, 
since Story later became a leading proponent of nondenominational 
Christianity during the earJy eighteenth century (p. 108). As to the 
latter principle, Smith credits James Madison, often considered the 
primary framer of the first amendment. In fact, Smith states that "it is 
Madison's role along with that of other advocates of religious liberty 
... that must be examined to ascertain the intent of the framers " (p. 
64). 
It is a crucial assertion of Public Prayer and the Constitution that 
the views of Story and Madison form the outer parameters for judicial 
interpretation of the religion clauses. While these positions admittedly 
delineate a broad latitude for constitutional decisionmaking, and in 
some cases even allow for judicial discretion, Smith asserts that no 
legitimate Supreme Court doctrine can exist outside of these two 
poles. Doctrine that effectively bars, or mandates, governmental in-
volvement with religion operates outside of this framework, and is 
therefore constitutionally suspect (p. 293). 
For Madison, the state's nonpartisan treatment of all religions was 
most important. In response to a state bill that would have supported 
Christianity as the established religion of America, Madison produced 
his Memorial and Remonstrance, written in 1785 and considered by 
Smith to be the "critical document" (p. 50) for understanding both 
Madison's views and ultimately the values behind the language of the 
first amendment. According to Smith, Madison's "primary concern" 
in Memorial was "with securing religious liberty rather than with as-
suring that the government prohibit all public expressions of religious 
faith" (p. 56). To secure this liberty, Madison felt it was vital that no 
single religion or sect be aided or established to the exclusion of less 
popular religions. As the right to free exercise was an "inalienable 
right," the Madisonian position held that a government "acted in der-
1296 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1294 
ogation of th[is] inalienable right" (p. 59) if it preferred one religion 
over another. 5 
While these Madisonian ideals influenced the framers, Smith notes 
that Justice Story played a major role in the initial application and 
interpretation of the religion clauses. The view that Christianity 
should serve as the national religion arose in the first half of the eight-
eenth century, and culminated in the 1833 publication of Story's Com-
mentaries on the Constitution, a major work on the probable intentions 
of the first amendment's framers. Story notes that the framers en-
couraged the public promotion of nondenominational Christianity, so 
long as other religions were tolerated (p. 108). In addition, the Com-
mentaries concluded that "[a]n attempt to level all religions, and to ... 
hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapproba-
tion if not universal indignation."6 
Based on these writings, Smith asserts that both Story and 
Madison concurred in the belief that free exercise was the preeminent 
value protected by the first amendment; "the Establishment Clause 
merely helped to effectuate [this value]."7 Whether one adopted the 
Madisonian position or a view more supportive of Christianity as the 
national religion, Smith states that in the revolutionary era "there was 
little if any support for the principle that government should be pre-
cluded from accommodating or recognizing religious exercise in any 
form." 8 In demonstrating how prevalent religion was in the public 
sector, Smith notes that in the Declaration oflndependence there were 
four references to God, and that in 1777 the Continental Congress had 
imported nearly twenty-thousand Bibles. 
After describing the major positions on religious liberty during the 
revolutionary era, Smith analyzes the debates and congressional wran-
gling over the drafting of the first amendment. The debates suggest 
that Congress also viewed the free exercise portion of the amendment 
as paramount, as several Senators, especially those who advocated a 
5. In another recently published work on the subject, Thomas Curry has argued that 
Madison opposed all governmental assistance of religion, even nonpreferential support. T. 
CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE JN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 209 (1986). . 
6. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 593 (2d ed. 
1851). 
7. P. 111. Indeed, Smith presents some evidence indicating that the First Congress saw the 
sole function of the establishment clause merely as a prohibition against establishing a national 
religion, not as a general preclusion against all government sponsorship. P. 95. 
8. P. 66. One prominent revolutionary figure who did support this principle was Thomas 
Jefferson. In an 1802 letter, Jefferson declared that the religion clauses "built a wall of separation 
between Church and State." P. 61. While contemporary strict separationists have used this 
comment to support their position, Smith thinks the letter of little value. First, Smith maintains 
that Jefferson's metaphor did not mean strict separation "in the sense that those terms have been 
used in the twentieth century." P. 62. And even if Jefferson did intend such a result, Smith 
contends that "Jefferson's role with regard to the adoption of the First Amendment was periph· 
era! at best." P. 63. 
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Christian republic, voiced concern over the chilling effect that a gener-
alized establishment clause might produce. In support of his conclu-
sion that the First Congress "did not intend to render all public 
manifestations of religious devotion unconstitutional," (p. 97) Smith 
notes that both the House and Senate adopted a national day of public 
fasting and prayer in celebration of the passage of the Bill of Rights. 
Using these and other examples (such as a congressionally approved 
treaty establishing a national church for an Indian group) (p. 105), 
Smith concludes that no support can be found for the "strict separa-
tion of church and state as we know it today" (p. 105). 
Much of the modem "strict separationism" that Smith decries,9 
and much of what he sees as the current constitutional illegitimacy, 
can be traced to the Supreme Court's first treatment of the religion 
clauses. For Smith, both Reynolds v. United States 10 and Everson v. 
Board of Education 11 represent a gross misapplication of constitu-
tional history. In Reynolds, its first free exercise case, the Court held 
that polygamy, practiced by many orthodox Mormons of the time, 
could be proscribed if it "br[oke] out into overt acts against peace and 
good order."12 This rationale was far more restrictive of individual 
religious freedom than either the Madison or Story positions, which 
would have allowed a limitation on this inalienable right only when 
the religious activity was "manifestly injurious" to the state's interests 
(p. 122). "Fortunately," Smith notes, more recent decisions have par-
tially redressed this initial misapplication; the current test allows regu-
lation of religious practices only "when there is a compelling state 
interest that justifies such regulation" (p. 124). While this less intru-
sive test does reduce governmental regulation of religion, Smith urges 
the Court to support its rationale with specific references to Madison 
and Story. 
The Everson decision, however, arouses Smith's greatest ire. In its 
first establishment clause case, the Court, per Justice Black, allowed 
public funds to be used to provide bus transportation for children at-
tending parochial schools, despite objections that this action actively 
"established" religion. Although this result was consistent with both 
the Madison and Story views (p. 126), Smith harshly criticizes Black's 
application of the relevant constitutional history. By concluding that 
"individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a govern-
ment which ... [did not] interfere with the beliefs of any religious 
9. Smith is so critical of the modern "strict separationists" - those who view any govern-
mental accommodation of religion as constitutionally impermissible - that one begins to wonder 
if this critique is not the real purpose behind the book. Smith asserts that this view emanates not 
from the colonial or founding era, but rather from "the second quarter of the twentieth century." 
P. 56. 
10. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
12. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163. 
1298 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1294 
individual or group," 13 Justice Black credited the framers with adopt-
ing a view of strict separation, a position Smith feels too severely re-
stricts individual rights of free exercise (p. 129). Smith points out that 
Black could have avoided such language by supporting his result with 
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance or the ratifying debates, as 
both demonstrate that nonpreferential aid to sectarian students is per-
missible. Even worse for Smith, subsequent decisions concerning reli-
gious expression have relied on Everson's improper reading of the 
framers, thereby entrenching the Court in decades of constitutional 
conflict (p. 131 ). 
After exposing the weak historical foundations of the Court's es-
tablishment clause doctrine, Smith discusses several public school 
prayer cases and in each instance demonstrates how the Court could 
have maintained fidelity to original intent by deciding the case using 
either the Madison or Story positions. The Court first examined school 
prayer in Engel v. Vitale 14 and School District v. Schempp. 15 In Engel, 
the Court prohibited the in-class reading of a short, nondenomina-
tional prayer commissioned by a state agency, holding that the "union 
of government and religion tends to destroy government and to de-
grade religion." 16 In Schempp, the Court held that the establishment 
clause prohibited the Pennsylvania legislature from mandating the 
reading of several Bible verses before the start of each school day. 
Smith acknowledges that the Court could have decided Engel and 
Schempp either way, as the diverging Madison and Story positions 
produce conflicting outcomes. Proponents of Story's view believed 
that a tolerant, but nondenominational, Christianity should be the na-
tional religion; therefore, they would have upheld the prayer practice 
in Engel and the Bible recitation in Schempp. Madison, however, 
would require the state to refrain from preferring or adopting any par-
ticular mode of worship; therefore, neither the Engel nor the Schempp 
practice would survive first amendment review. 
Had the Court confined its reasoning within these positions, Smith 
asserts, the Justices could have achieved greater legitimacy as well as 
greater fidelity to original intent (p. 185). Instead, both Engel and 
Schempp are "heavily imbued with the strict-separationist rationale 
first articulated in Everson" (p. 172), and as such pose the same prob-
lem presented by Everson: the results were constitutionally support-
able, but the Court's rationale - in limiting the importance of individ-
ual religious exercise - surely was not. 
Besides the issue of vocal prayer recitations presented by Engel 
and Schempp, Smith reviews the Court's recent performance in Wal-
13. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11. 
14. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
15. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
16. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431. 
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lace v. Jaffree, 17 the seminal silent prayer case. The issue of silent 
prayer, Smith admits, is "the most difficult problem covered in this 
book, in terms of applying the views of Story and Madison" (p. 214). 
In Wallace, the Court struck down a state statute mandating a one-
minute period of silence for meditation or voluntary silent prayer, con-
cluding that the legislature intended to convey a message of state ap-
proval for religious activities in the public schools. Again, Smith 
demonstrates how the Story view would have supported such silent 
activity, especially given that its major purpose was to encourage vol-
untary prayer (p. 210). But for Madison, the issue would be less clear 
given the language "voluntary prayer," which could be interpreted as 
promoting a particular mode of worship (in which case Madison 
would not support it), or as facilitating individual exercise (in which 
case the practice would be permissible). Because neither the Madison 
nor Story position serves as a panacea for the silent prayer issue, Smith 
acknowledges that the courts are not so constrained by original intent. 
Using this greater discretion, courts are thus free to "engage in in-
dependent balancing of various policies" (p. 214). 
Not only does Smith admit that the result in several recent deci-
sions is constitutionally legitimate (p. 234), he also notes the increas-
ing use the Court has recently made of the relevant history. For 
example, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace examined Madison's 
writings as well as Story's Commentaries in a search for the implicit 
values contained within the religion clauses. Further, the Court's 
opinion in Marsh v. Chambers, 18 a case upholding the Nebraska legis-
lature's right to hire a chaplain to preside over the opening prayer, is 
replete with references to the religious practices of the ratifying era. 
Rather than relying on the three-part test announced in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 19 Chief Justice Burger's opinion adheres closely to the 
Story view, which permits hiring a chaplain so long as no Christian 
sect is preferred over another (p. 257). Even the dissent, authored by 
an ardent nonoriginalist (Justice Brennan), utilizes certain Madisonian 
principles to argue against the chaplain's use. 
For Smith, the debate in Marsh is highly encouraging since it pro-
ceeds within his framework of legitimate constitutional analysis. In 
addition, the Court gives due deference to "definite historical roots" 
17. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
18. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
19. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). It is odd that Smith does not find space to criticize the 
Lemon Court's three-pronged test for establishment clause violations. This test analyzes all sus-
pect legislation by inquiring: (1) whether the statute has a secular purpose; (2) whether the 
statute's primary effect either advances or inhibits religion; and (3) whether the statute fosters an 
"excessive entanglement" with religion. Smith admits that this test "certainly inhibits individual 
religious exercise," but he makes no effort to argue, as others have, that this test is the real cause 
behind the Court's inconsistent establishment clause opinions. P. 284. See, e.g., Laycock, A Sur-
vey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 450 (1986) (arguing that the 
Lemon test is "so elastic in its application that it means everything and nothing"). 
1300 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1294 
(p. 258), another factor Smith would accord great weight. Yet Smith, 
perhaps doubting whether other "legitimate" decisions will arise 
again, warns the Court that disregarding the originalist parameters 
will trigger a justified "time for concerted legislative action" (p. 235). 
Continuing this none-too-subtle warning, Smith's final chapter 
suggests ways to change the Court's role in religion cases. While ex-
pressing disapproval of the recent attempts to limit the court's juris-
diction in public prayer cases,2° Smith sees no problem with ultimately 
revising the first amendment. He suggests that a "general, principled 
amendment could be fashioned ... after the Madisonian approach" (p. 
293) so as to protect individual expression from the "tyranny of the 
majority" (p. 275 n.32). However, Smith concludes that' the time for 
such a revision has not yet come since the Court has remained rela-
tively faithful to the Madisonian position. Because it has "continued 
to render decisions within the limits set by the framers' intent" (p. 275 
n.32), the Court has not yet provided the justification for dramatic 
action by either Congress or the nation. 
This conclusion is a troubling one and undermines much of the 
book's force. By first asserting that the Supreme Court has fallen prey 
to the conflicting orders inherent in the religion clauses, but then ad-
mitting that the recent Court has been faithful to original intent, Smith 
weakens his key premise that this original intent provides the values 
necessary to resolve these conflicting orders. Also, merely stating that 
greater respect should be accorded the value of individual expression is 
not helpful, since Smith fails to explain how this respect would avoid 
the thorny problem of government entanglement that has plagued the 
Court in past cases. Thus, Smith's major goal remains unfulfilled: 
neither the Madison nor Story position provides the Court with 
enough vision to fashion a clear and consistent approach to the public 
prayer cases. 21 
Finally, Smith adds nothing to the controversial debate over origi-
nal intent analysis.22 He devotes very little effort to rebutting the ar-
guments of the noninterpretivists, and the values Smith derives from 
original intent seem to lead not to a heightened legitimacy for 
Supreme Court doctrine but rather to the same inconsistencies that 
have beset those who advocate interpretivism. While Smith provides a 
20. See, e.g., S.47, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (bill introduced by Senator Helms would 
eliminate federal court jurisdiction in cases involving voluntary prayer, Bible reading, and reli-
gious meetings in the public schools). 
21. Actually, this book would be more aptly titled, as its unspoken purpose suggests, "An 
Attack on the Strict Separationists." Here, Smith achieves some success by demonstrating that 
none of the framers advocated the type of government prohibition espoused in Everson v. Board 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). But even this success is diminished by Smith's admission that 
several recent Supreme Court decisions have respected individual religious exercise to a greater 
degree than in past cases. Pp. 257-58. 
22. See note 4 supra for a brief summary of the major positions. 
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useful summary of the major positions surrounding the framing of the 
religion clauses, neither the Court nor the combatants on either side of 
this first amendment debate will gain much new insight from Public 
Prayer and the Constitution. 
- Ethan M. Posner 
